Stephen Farrell is a research fellow at TCD, working and teaching mainly on delay tolerant networking (DTN) and security. Stephen is co-chair of the Internet Research Task Force's Delay Tolerant Networking Research Group (DTNRG), and of the Internet Engineering Task Force's Domain Keys Internet Mail (DKIM) working group.

Prior to TCD, Stephen worked in Industry for 16 years including as a product architect for a Siemens subsidiary and as director of research for Baltimore Technologies.

Stephen is also currently working with Newbay (www.newbay.com) as part-time chief technologist.

Presentation
Security Boundaries and Surfaces
The Open Group's Jericho forum have been espousing the concept of de-perimiterization, which essentially deprecates the concept of the DMZ. Separately, some systems developers have been developing the concept of the "attack surface" of a system as an indicator of the relative vulnerability of comparable systems. In the Internet community, security seems to be more and more being pushed into network elements, largely on the basis that the host systems seem to be far too easy to compromise. But this trend towards security middleboxes (e.g. NATs, firewalls) seems (at least at first) to go against the end-to-end principle revered by the same Internet community. The disruption tolerant networking community are also starting to look at how to architect security in challenged networks, which may lead to a new, or at least a slightly different concept of a security boundary. In this talk I will describe and reflect on these trends, how they might interact and will speculate on where that may all lead.

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