

THE *Open* GROUP



Boundaryless Information Flow
Open Source in the Enterprise

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Digital Rights Management - The Implications of Open Source

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Open Source in the Enterprise - 08 Sep 2003

I Propose Not To Discuss:

- Whether intellectual property is a viable concept
 - ... “information wants to be free”
- Whether consumers should be assumed to be honest
 - ... “innocent until proven guilty”
- Premise: owners of intellectual property legitimately wish to police consumers’ use of digital content to enforce limited rights

Trust Issues

- Content provider doesn't trust the user
 - ... “reverse threat model”
- Content provider *does* trust the device manufacturer
 - ... on-device agent to act in *their* interests
- To get the benefits of DRM, user must surrender some degree of control to the device manufacturer
 - ... deliberately and voluntarily

Need Openness

- Openness to Independent Software Vendors
 - ... Documented APIs
 - ... ISVs would need to be “blessed” somehow
- Openness to Service Providers
 - ... Interoperable protocols
 - ... Open standards allow mix-and-match services and devices
- Openness to Content Providers
 - ... Unconstrained content provision
 - ... Should allow fair access to “independent labels”
- Openness to Consumers
 - ... Coexistence with free content
 - ... Willing cooperation, not coercion

Need Real Benefits To Users

- New pricing models
 - ... e.g. OD2
 - £1 to burn a track to an unprotected CD
 - 10p to download a track to a single device for 1 year
 - 1p to listen to a track once
- Convenience
 - ... iTunes (5 million tracks sold in 8 weeks)
 - more reliable, better presented, easier to use than peer-to-peer file sharing
- Respect “fair use”
 - ... backup/restore, move between devices

The End of “Security by Obscurity”

- Open source implies:
 - ... No secret algorithms
 - ... No secret APIs
 - ... No compiled-in secret tokens
 - ... No obfuscation of code
- Problem:
 - ... How do you implement a *mandatory* security policy when a user can freely examine and modify the code?


Mandatory Security Policies - Part 1

- Add a new privilege level to the processor
 - ... Intel - “LaGrande Technology”
 - ... ARM - “TrustZone”

Very simplified:

Needs integrity checks
to prevent tampering
with supervisor

- ... Supervisor could grow
very large



Mandatory Security Policies - Part 2

- Verification of run-time state
 - ... Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA)
 - (Palladium / NGSCB)
 - ... extended by Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
 - for mobile devices
- Hardware Trusted Platform Module
 - ... Allows “trusted” applications to use public key cryptography to authenticate themselves to content servers
 - ... Keys are only released if and when the system is in a known state (h/w and s/w integrity checks)

In Closing...

- Will open source DRM be implemented?
 - ... There are open protocol/format standards
 - Open Mobile Alliance DLDRM
 - ISO MPEG-21
 - ... The necessary hardware is on the way
 - LaGrande, TrustZone, TCPA/TCG
 - ... But is there the will to do it?
 - Linus says he is OK with the idea of DRM on Linux
 - ... but who will implement it?
 - Content providers may still worry about security
 - ... can't hide vulnerabilities in the mechanism