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Acquisition Cybersecurity (ACS) Initiative

Objective of Meeting

The Acquisition Cybersecurity (ACS) Initiative involves participants of the United States Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) working with industry organizations to explore best practices in product development, manufacturing, and supply-chain management that are necessary to develop trustworthy commercial products and to be able to procure these with confidence.

This objective of this meeting was to:

  • Provide an overview of the ACS initiative
  • Introduce the Trustworthy Product Framework, which seeks to identify existing best practices needed to identify trustworthy products and components and offer the opportunity to review and provide feedback on that work thus far
  • Extend participation to the global community

Summary

An introduction was provided by Dave Lounsbury, VP of The Open Group Consortia Services, in which he stated that the DoD (AT&L) contracted The Open Group to begin an Acquisition Cybersecurity (ACS) Initiative to help government and commercial organizations to “build with integrity and procure with confidence”. Dave provided an overview of recent and future milestones to provide some context to the current state of the Initiative.

Milestones:

  • Stakeholder Kick-off Meeting, San Francisco, January 7, 2010
  • Business Scenario Workshop, The Open Group Conference, Seattle, February 1, 2010
  • Online Open Review of Trusted Technology Provide Framework and Business Scenario, April/May 2010
  • Finalize Change Recommendations, The Open Group Conference, Boston, July 2010
  •  Publish Trusted Technology Provide Framework and Business Scenario, September 2010
  • Agree long-term strategy recommendations for Initiative, September 2010
  •  Compendium of Best Practices and Technical Standards for Acquisition in Cybersecurity, September 2010
  • Evolution of Acquisition Compendium and Initiative, October 2010 and further

Following Dave Lounsbury’s introduction, the Trusted Technology Provider Framework was presented by Andras Szakal, IBM, who has been working diligently to facilitate progress on this document over the past several weeks.

The information below is extracted from the DRAFT Introduction to the Trusted Technology Provider Framework Document – and is not for re-distribution outside of the ACS Initiative participants at this time. It is included here to give you a good idea of what the group is working on. If you are interested in participating in this initiative and accessing the Trusted Technology Framework Document in full, please contact Sally Long at s.long@opengroup.org.

DRAFT Introduction to the Trusted Technology Provider Framework

Industry Best Practices for manufacturing technology products that facilitate customer technology acquisition risk management practices

Background

Governments and large enterprises are cognizant and appreciative of the benefits of globalization. At the same time, they recognize their increasing reliance on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information technology (IT) components (software and hardware) to deliver mission-critical operations.

As cyber attacks increase in sophistication, stealth, and severity, governments and larger enterprises have also begun to take a more comprehensive approach to risk management and product assurance.  In addition to enhancing information security by improving security practices across the enterprise, governments and enterprises have begun inquiring about the practices information technology vendors use to protect the integrity of their products and services as they move through the global supply chain.

Governments and commercial consumers have expressed specific interest in understanding how vendors manage the risks inherent in globalized product development and manufacturing including:

  • What potential integrity risk may be inherited from supply chains, both for software and hardware, and how the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) assesses and manages these risks
  • Practices that can mitigate potential risks of significant supply-chain attacks
  • Risks to confidentiality, integrity, and availability to a customer's environment or critical infrastructure as a result of procurement by customers of counterfeit components and products
  • What software or technology development or engineering practices can help reduce product integrity risks
  • How is product assurance and risk managed through the adoption of industry best practices and recognized international testing standards?

Commercial enterprise and government customers share an interest in understanding what factors contribute to product integrity and how to identify a trustworthy COTS product.

Determination of trusted status is impeded in part due to the lack of (1) consistent terms; (2) uniformly agreed upon supply-chain standards, practices, and approaches; and (3) comprehensive common ways of thoroughly testing the performance and integrity of a product in a way that keeps pace with innovation, investigates diversely sourced components, and is applicable globally.

To address these challenges the US Department of Defense (DoD) sponsored this project to promote an industry-wide effort where vendors identify the current best practices and processes that contribute to the secure and trusted development, manufacture, delivery, and ongoing operation of commercial products.  This framework is intended to identify those best practices and product assurance standards. From a common base it will be more feasible for consumers to establish more effective acquisition and risk management processes.

Through a collaborative effort, we envision identifying best practices that when applied cohesively and appropriately would translate into a level of assurance that could be communicated to customers. This would benefit both the supplier and buyer communities, as it would give suppliers accepted industry-common targets for which to aim and allow buyers to more easily identify products that meet secure, trusted development and manufacturing criteria. Vendors investing in and attaining these practices and processes would gain a deserved market differentiator. By establishing a framework that defines the characteristics of product trustworthiness, some of the current overlapping and redundant certification and accreditation efforts might become streamlined, thereby reducing effort and enabling government to take better advantage of current technology from the commercial technology providers.

Purpose and Objectives of the ACS Initiative

The purpose of this work group is to identify and gain consensus on common processes, techniques, methods, product and system testing procedures, and language to describe and guide product development and supply-chain management practices that can mitigate vulnerabilities which could lead to exploitation and malicious threats to product integrity.

The objectives are to:

  • Identify product assurance practices that should be expected from all commercial technology vendors based on the baseline best practices of leading trusted commercial technology suppliers
  • Help establish expectations for global government and commercial customers when seeking to identify a trusted technology supplier
  • Leverage existing globally recognized information assurance practices and standards; for example, common criteria
  • Share with commercial technology consumers secure manufacturing and trustworthy technology supplier best practices
  • Harmonize language used to describe best practices

If you would like to participate in evolving this set of best practices and in helping to shape how this set of best practices will be used to indicate trustworthy products, please contact Sally Long at s.long@opengroup.org.


   
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